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no true oath (as m the Latiolazs situation) then the crime of perjury is impossible
and therefore could not have been attempted. However, the fact that the substan-
tive crime is impossible does not make the attempt to commit the crime impossible.
Intent, when coupled with an overt act tending toward the substantive crime, is
a vital element which makes an attempt to commit a crime (including perjury)
punishable, if the actor believed he had the ability to commit the basic offense.
When the prosecution is only for an attempt to commit that crime, then the ele-
ment of intent sweeps away any bars that would have blocked a conviction for the
substantive crime when such bars were unknown to the defendant.
By this Latiolais decision, loopholes for escaping punishment foi perjury have
not been removed, but the attempting perjurer cannot escape all possible punish-
ment by later setting up objections to the substantive crime unknown to him at
the time of the attempt. He will be readily punished for attempted perjury Sec-
ondly, this case strengthens the precedents for punishing frustrated attempts to
commit other crimes. Those who believe that social necessity requires that the law
be a useful instrument in crime punishment and prevention will agree with this
writer that State v. Latiolas26 is a firm step in the proper direction.
Gerald N Hill
DISBARMENT" ADMISSION TO THE BAR OBTAINED BY FRAUD.
In the recent case of In re Hyra,l Hyra was suspended from the practice of
law for two years because in his application for admission to the bar he falsely
answered "no" to the following question:
"Have you ever been concerned as a party plaintiff or defendant, or witness m any
legal proceedings? If so, state fully the court, adnnistrative office or tribunal, the
character of the proceedings and your relationship to it."
When he was 18 years old Hyra had been convicted on five counts of burglary and
larceny His sentence had been suspended and he had been placed on probation.
The majority of the court, in a three to four decision, was of the opinion that
severe disciplinary action had to be taken. However, the court felt that disbarment
was too severe in view of the fact that, except for the crimes he had denied, he had
led an exemplary life both before and after the false swearing.
The minority was of the view that mitigating circumstances were not in ques-
tion. If Hyra obtained his license to practice law by fraud he had to be disbarred.
The dissent is detailed with citations from various jurisdictions. At first read-
ing it appears to be the better conclusion, especially since the majority's opinion
is brief and includes no cited authority whatsoever.
Two questions are presented by the decision:
1. Is a license to practice law which is obtained through fraud absolutely void
or is it merely voidable?
2. What degree of latitude do judges possess in disciplinary proceedings against
a lawyer?
As to question No. 1, if we find that the license is voidable only, then the
majority opinion can be supported on the theory that in not revoking the license
26 See note 1 supra.
115 N.J. 252, 104 A.2d 609 (1954).
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the court has waived its option to disaffirm the license. The license being valid and
subsisting can, therefore, be the subject of suspension.
It is interesting to note that the courts do not use the words "void" and "void-
able" in this connection. Yet it is clear from a reading of the cases that the status
of the license is a primary question even though the cases do not directly state
which class they deem the license to be in. Most of the courts state that obtaining
a license to practice law by false statements or concealment of facts is a fraud
upon the court.2 Some of the courts then go on to say that this requires disbarment,
3
while others state that the license should be revoked.4
If disbarment is the proper procedure, the license must be deemed to be only
voidable. Disbarment presupposes membership in the bar. A void license having
no legal existence is in reality no license at all. Without a license how can one be a
member of the bar? On the other hand, a voidable license is valid and such a valid
license would support membership in the bar until revoked.
Thus it may be said that cases holding such fraud requires disbarment are
stating a conclusion on the facts of the case and not an absolute rule. The court
may conclude on the facts involved that the particular fraud requires disbarment.
It does not hold that every such fraud, without consideration of the facts and
circumstances, requires disbarment.
In cases where the license is required to be revoked it is more proper to con-
sider the license as void. If the license were only voidable the holder would have to
be disbarred. Most of the courts simply say that the license is revoked and the
attorney's name is to be stricken from the rolls.5 A few cases have held that the
license is revoked and the holder disbarred. 6 It would seem quite clear that in
these cases the license is deemed to be only voidable. Still another line of cases
hold that such fraud is ground for revoking the license. 7 Here is would appear that
the court deems the license to be only voidable; but they use revocation alone,
failing to order disbarment.
Thus, as seen above, most of the cases can be construed as holding the license
to be only voidable. The only cases that cannot be so construed are those holding
that such fraud requires revocation of the license. Upon what basis can it be held
that a license obtained by fraud is void? Is it by analogy to contract principles
or by a legislative or judicial rule which the court must follow?
If the analogy is to contract, the license must be construed as only voidable
for the reason that it would be fraud in the inducement and not fraud in the in-
ception (fraud in factum). To be fraud in the inception the court, in granting the
license, must have thought that it was granting the person something other than
that which it actually did grant.8 In the present case, the court intended, and did
give, Hyra a license to practice law The only fraud involved was in the reason
which induced the court to issue the license, and this would clearly be fraud in
the inducement. 9
2 In re Moshkow, 250 App.Div 780, 294 N.Y.S. 474 (1937), State v Pedell, 189 Wis. 457,
207 N.W 709 (1926). See also cases collected m 165 A.L.R. 1133.
3 In re Price, 226 App.Div 460, 235 N.Y.S. 601 (1929).
4 In re Bladwin, 258 App.Div. 661, 17 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1940), In re Mash, 28 Cal.App. 692,
153 Pac. 961 (1915).
5 In re Bladwin, supra note 4.
6Prapper v Owens, 136 Ga. 787, 72 S.E. 242 (1911).7 1n re Marx, 115 App.Div 448, 101 N.Y.S. 608 (1906).
8 Lovato v. Catron, 20 N.M. 168, 148 Pac. 490 (1915)
9 Ibid.
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As for a rule that requires disbarment in such cases, there is no such statute
in New Jersey; and as this was a case of first impression within the state, there
was no prior decision to bind the court upon principles of stare decists.
There is another point m favor of construing the license as voidable. Such a
construction would in no way affect the stability of adjudicated cases whereas if
it were held void it might. An example of this would be where one has been charged
in a state court with a felony The charged felon has the right to the asssitance of
counsel guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.' 0 Counsel
has been defined to include only those admitted to the bar of the state." A person
under a void license would not have been counsel whereas if it were only voidable
he would have been.
Chief Justice Vanderbilt's argument in his dissent that since the court could
have refused to grant the license had they known of Hyra's past conviction the
license is therefore void, oddly enough lends itself to the view that the license is
voidable. The court, on Hyra's admission, had the choice of either admitting him
or not. It appears quite reasonable that when they find out about it later they
should have the same choice and be able to revoke the license or affirm it.
It seems to this writer that the better position is that the license is merely
voidable. It being merely voidable, the court, in suspending Hyra, waived its
option to revoke the license and thereby affirmed it.
The court's position may be sustained on a much broader principle than the
one given above. The courts have great latitude in matters of admission and dis-
cipline of the bar as this is a sphere where the court has inherent judicial power. 2
Inherent power of the judiciary has been defined to mean, "that which is essential
to the existence, dignity and functions of the court from the very fact that it is
a court."'i 3
Several reasons have been given to show that regulation of lawyers falls within
this power. The more salient ones can be classified into three major groups.
1. The court should regulate lawyers for its own sake. Attorneys as such first
decide the law when a client comes to them; their ability to decide means much to
the court.14 Another reason is that the bench is recruited in the most part from the
ranks of the bar.15 Perhaps the reason given most often is that a lawyer is an
officer of the court (not in the sense that he can bind the court by his actions, but
due to the lawyer's close relationship with the court). As such it is important for
the court to exercise its control over the attorney 16
2. The court should regulate the bar for the sake of the public. If people
could not put their faith in attorneys, the function of the bench would decrease and
its dignity be lowered.17
l 0 Williains v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1944).
11 Higgins v. Parker, 354 Mo. 888, 191 S.W.2d 668 (1945).
2 In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E.2d 516, 137 A.L.R. 766 (1941), Montgomery Co.
Bar. Assn. v. Rinalducci, 329 Pa. 296, 197 A. 924 (1938).
13Re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W 265, 114 A.L.R.
151 (1937).
14 Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiczary, 21 A.BAJ. 635 (1935).
15In re Application for License to Practice Law, 67 W Va. 213, 67 S.E. 597 (1910), Fair-
field Co. Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 22 A. 4417 (1891).
16 Carpenter v. State Bar of Califorma, 81 Cal. 114, 295 Pac. 23 (1931), People ex rel.
Karlin v. Culkm, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
'
7 State Bar of Califorma v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 590, 278 Pac. 432 (1929), In re Co-
Operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 478, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
Mar., 1955l NOTES
